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Metaphors of Madness: 
Women and Mental Illness 
by Donna E. Smyth 
La litterature de toute societe fouvnit 
certains points d''identification cul-
turelle, poteaux indicateurs qui, si 
nous sommes familiers avec le langage 
utilise, nous introduiront d I'univers 
mental de cette meme societe. Pour 
cette raison, j 'ai choisi un caractere 
littSraire, la femme folle, dans le 
hut d'explorer le changement de nos 
attitudes face au desordre mental. 
Prenons comme point de repere Bertha 
Mason, I'Spouse folle de Monsieur 
Rochester dans Jane Eyre de Charlotte 
Bronte", et egalement, le roman de Jean 
Rhys, The Wide Sargasso Sea, qui 
recree le personnage de Bertha Mason et 
tente de decrire I'experience de son 
point de vue. Nous pouvons alors 
identifier deux cas extremes. Dans 
Jane Eyre, la folie est le fait de 
I 'Autre, personnage mineur qui permet 
de nouer I'intrigue. Dans le roman de 
Rhys, la folie est explorSe comme une 
experience faite d la premiere per-
sonne, c'est-d-dire vecue de fagon 
subjective. Entre ces deux extremes 
s'est produit un deplacement dans 
notre perception culturelle de la 
maladie mentale, deplacement etudie 
par I 'artiste, non pas au moyen des 
categories rationnelles formelles de la 
psychiatrie et de la psychologie, mais 
d trovers la metaphore et I'image. Par 
rapport aux perceptions medicates et 
scientifiques de notre monde mental, 
I 'approche de I 'artiste vers I'ir-
rationnel constitue un contrepoint 
necessaire et valable. C'est ce que 
nous voulons demontrer dans cet expose. 
L 'art agit comme un mediateur entre le 
rationnel et I'irrationnel et, dans le 
cas de la littSrature fournit des ponts 
verbaux entre le rationnel et I'objec-
tif, entre I 'irrationnel et le subjec-
tif. De recentes critiques, en 
provenance de I'interieur de la profes-
sion medicale, tels les tvavaux de 
Thomas Szasz sur le mythe de I 'aliena-
tion mentale, et en provenance du 
mouvement feministe, comme dans Women 
and Madness de Phyllis Chesler et dans 
Women Look at Psychiatry de Dorothy E. 
Smith, demontrent I'incapaciti de notre 
societe a manier I'irrationnel tel 
qu'il se manifeste dans la maladie 
mentale. 
The literature of a society provides 
cultural identification points where 
overt and covert values of that society 
are reflected and d i s t i l l e d i n language, 
image and literary type. Changing at-
titudes to mental illness, for example, 
can be observed in the type of the Mad 
Woman, particularly the Mad Wife. 
Elaine Showalter, in A Literature of 
Their Own, refers to this type as a 
"feminine archetype"(1)but, as we shall 
see, i t is at times d i f f i c u l t to dis-
tinguish archetype and stereotype in 
either literary or cultural terms. 
Take the case of Jane Eyre (1847) where 
madness is objectively manifested in a 
minor character f u l f i l l i n g a plot func-
tion.^) Bertha Mason i s Rochester's 
secret burden and Jane's secret r i v a l . 
The reader sees her from Jane's point 
of view and i s not expected to identify 
with this Mad Wife. Here the cultural 
and literary conventions meet.. It i s 
a mark of Rochester's potential good 
character and his social class that he 
has his wife privately cared for i n -
stead of abandoning her or committing 
her to a pubiic asylum. Unable to ob-
tain a divorce, he i s the noble victim 
of the marriage. Bronte must also 
have been familiar with a popular 
literary stereotype of her time—the 
Deranged Woman who appears in numerous 
melodramas. This type, instantly 
recognizable by her dishevelled hair, 
was a minor character whose derangement 
was the result of being seduced and 
abandoned.(3) she evoked moments of 
sentimental pity and moral enlighten-
ment but was not intended to provoke 
the audience to any consideration of 
madness or i t s causes. 
In Bronte's novel, Bertha's madness i s 
vaguely described by Rochester as a 
result of her Creole inheritance, a 
certain taint in the blood as i t were, 
not unconnected with her sexuality. 
It i s suggested that Rochester was 
tricked into marrying her and our 
sympathy i s directed towards him. The 
fi r e i s the coincidence of ficti o n , 
melodramatic but also symbolic; i t not 
only frees Rochester but also purges 
him through physical loss and injury 
so that he meets Jane afterwards as an 
equal both materially and spir i t u a l l y . 
Bertha has set the f i r e and there i s 
an unforgettable image of her fin a l 
stand on the balcony with her hair 
streaming out against the flames. The 
fiery furnace destroys her, purges him. 
If Bertha represents female passion, 
both sexual and otherwise, then she may 
be viewed as symbolic; in fact, she i s 
Jane's alter ego, her demonic, dark 
side. What we then have is an i n -
teresting triadic relationship between 
Jane, Rochester and Bertha. Rochester, 
being white, male and wealthy, repre-
sents the power invested in this par-
ticular patriarchal society. He has 
no hesitation about trying to exploit 
Jane sexually because she i n i t i a l l y 
appears to him as the perfect victim 
in that society—a young woman without 
male protectors and without money. On 
this level, Jane's situation resembles 
Bertha's as Bertha is a foreigner in 
England and has had to give up, by law, 
a l l properties and money to Rochester 
when she married him. 
The attitudes of the nineteenth cen-
tury English middle class toward sexu-
a l i t y have been well-documented.(4) 
Being Creole and coming from a di f f e r -
ent culture places Bertha outside 
these attitudes. As a passionate and 
desiring woman, she i s closer to 
Rochester's experiences with mistresses 
and whores than to his ideal of a wife. 
It i s here too that Jane has to watch 
her step. Her refusal to become 
Rochester's mistress is a shrewd one. 
If she, loving him and desiring him, 
were to give in to her desires, she 
would lose his respect as well as her 
own. Rochester, for example, says, 
"Hiring a mistress i s the next worst 
thing to buying a slave: both are ofter 
by nature, and always by position, i n -
ferior: and to live familiarly with i n -
feriors i s degrading." (p. 352) Jane 
hears the message clearly: 
I f e l t the truth of these words; 
and I drew from them the certain 
inference, that i f I were so far 
to forget myself and a l l the 
teaching that had ever been in-
s t i l l e d into me, as—under any pre-
text—with any j u s t i f i c a t i o n — 
through any temptation—to become 
successor of these poor g i r l s , he 
would one day regard me with the 
same feeling which now in his mind 
desecrated their memory.(p. 352) 
For her social survival, her sexual 
nature must be confined, locked up like 
Bertha in the atti c . 
The pattern continues with The Yellow 
Wallpaper written in the 1880s by 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman.(5) The nar-
rator is locked in a room by her hus-
band, John, a doctor who is forcing 
his wife to follow the "rest cure" of 
Dr. Weir Mitchell,(6)an American 
physician who treated neurotic 
patients in the fashion described by 
Gilman. Mitchell's "rest cure" a l -
lowed the patient to do nothing, 
secluded her from a l l human contact 
except the nurses and doctor attending 
her, and encouraged her to overeat un-
t i l she experienced significant weight 
gains.(7) In the course of Gilman's 
story, i t becomes evident that this 
treatment is contributing to her 
breakdown. In order to control her 
chaotic sense impressions, she attempts 
to write but is forbidden to do so by 
her husband. She i s driven back upon 
her own mind at precisely the time when 
she is discovering that mind as a 
threatening place. Her husband treats 
her like a child. He i s affectionate 
but insensitive to his wife's state of 
mind. Despite her pleas he refuses to 
take her out of the room or allow her 
to be active. He is the rational 
husband/doctor, a double authority 
figure who confines the irrational 
female. 
At the end of the century, Virginia 
Woolf too suffered the Weir Mitchell 
treatment. Showalter refers to her as 
the " r e a l - l i f e epitome of that feminine 
archetype, the Mad Wife." (p. 276) Are 
we then to see Leonard Woolf as a Dr. 
John? In some ways the pattern appears 
to f i t , as in the case of his decision 
not to have children. On the other 
hand, Virginia wrote nothing of im-
portance un t i l after her marriage, and 
Leonard's encouragement of her work is 
documented in her diary as well as 
the Bell biography. The dangers of the 
biographical fallacy are demonstrated 
in Showalter's chapter which i s a 
curious attempt to prove that Virginia's 
concept of the androgynous vision was 
an avoidance of her sexuality. In 
order to prove this hypothesis, 
Showalter has to distort the "real-
l i f e " complexities of Virginia's i l l -
ness, (8) her bisexual experiences, and 
her attempts to record faithfully her 
experience of that type of creativity 
which Keats called "negative capabil-
i t y . " Showalter's biographical 
archetype thus distorts more than i t 
illuminates. 
What i s more interesting here i s the 
intimate relationship between 
Virginia's madness and her creativity, 
a relationship which she perceived, 
at times, as a necessary stage of the 
creative process: 
If I could stay in bed another 
fortnight (but there i s no chance 
of that) I believe I should see 
the whole of THE WAVES. . . . I 
believe these illnesses are i n my 
case—how shall I express i t ? — 
partly mystical. Something hap-
pens in my mind. It refuses to go 
on registering impressions. It 
shuts i t s e l f up. It becomes 
chrysalis. I l i e quite torpid, 
often with acute physical p a i n — 
as last year; only discomfort this. 
Then something springs.(9) 
Regardless of the c l i n i c a l pathology of 
the i l l n e s s , this i s a revelation from 
inside the experience i t s e l f . If 
Woolf i s to be regarded as a type of 
the Mad Wife, the duality that makes 
sense and gives dignity to her struggles 
i s not externalised in herself as 
Leonard's wife but internalized i n the 
alternating patterns of c l a r i t y and 
obscurity, rational and irrational, 
which form the ontogenesis of her 
works. 
Such a view of Virginia Woolf's mad-
ness is only possible through our 
changing perceptions of madness in 
this century. The extent of these 
changes is reflected, f i r s t of a l l , in 
Jean Rhys' novel, Wide Sargasso Sea 
(1966).(10) Here we return to the 
literary type of the Mad Wife in the 
character of Bertha Mason whom Rhys 
borrows from Jane Eyre and makes the 
central character of her own novel. 
Rhys' Bertha, originally called 
Antoinette Cosway, is a mad Creole 
heiress of the 1830s. Her madness i s 
inherited but, in part, is also due to 
shocking childhood experiences. When 
Rochester arrives, he i s , as in 
Bronte's novel, the younger son of a 
well-established English family who have 
sent him out to the West Indies to find 
himself a wealthy wife. He i s tricked 
into marrying Antoinette by her family 
who are anxious to get r i d of her but 
he i s also implicated in the act be-
cause he marries in haste for money. 
Antoinette f a l l s in love with him. He 
i s her saviour who w i l l rescue her from 
an abusive society and her own chaotic 
mind. 
Rochester, in the fine B i b l i c a l phrase, 
lusts after Antoinette. For a short 
honeymoon period i t seems that he 
might even come to love her. Then he 
learns that she comes from a family 
with "tainted blood;" i.e., madness. 
At the same time he becomes disoriented 
away from English, white culture and 
in a tropical climate. He discovers 
that the thing he mistrusts most about 
Antoinette i s that which drew him to 
her, her sexual beauty and responsive-
ness. As the relationship begins to 
break up, Antoinette begins to break 
down. The more she retreats into mad-
ness, the more Rochester keeps her at 
a distance, objectifying her as a 
"doll," an image to which he constantly 
refers. He also tries to give her an 
English name, to "englishfy" her as 
Bertha. Antoinette t e l l s him, "Bertha 
is not my name. You are trying to 
make me into someone else, calling me 
by another name." (p. 147) She knows 
what he is doing but is powerless to 
stop him. The more white and rational 
and controlled he becomes, the more 
she is forced to be the Other. 
Rochester punishes her, not only for 
her sexuality, but for his own. The 
result is tragic. 
Rhys' attitudes are expressed through 
through her characters. Madness be-
comes metaphor, becomes a vision of 
the world which i s beautiful and ter-
rifying. Beautiful because i t is 
sensuous, passionate and alive but 
terrifying because i t is out of con-
t r o l ; that i s , things happen to 
Antoinette, she does not make them 
happen. The dualistic pattern becomes 
then: female, sexual, irrational, 
chaotic; male, puritannical, rational, 
ordered. On this level, Antoinette's 
personal madness allows her no 
bridges back to the rational. The 
potential mediating figure i s her a l -
ternative mother and old nurse, 
Christophine, who i s a native and a 
woman of "obeah," the West Indies folk 
magic and religion. Christophine at-
tempts to reconcile the couple but 
Rochester, highly suspicious of native 
superstitions, rejects her wise advice. 
He insists upon taking Antoinette back 
to England and he insists that she be-
come the Bertha Mason of Jane Eyre. 
Rhys' treatment of Bertha indicates 
both a more modern perception of mad 
ness and modern literary conventions. 
It also indicates a developing aware-
ness which, while not overtly feminist, 
directs our attention to the negative 
female image and presents that image 
from a sympathetic point of view. If 
we accept a projection hypothesis for 
Bronte's novel in which Jane's secret 
sexual self i s projected onto Bertha, 
then we now have a writer claiming that 
secret, sexual self as her territory. 
There are these changes but also the 
pattern which remains the same: the 
male i s s t i l l dominant and rational 
and, in a specific way, repressive of 
the female who i s s t i l l socially and 
personally subordinate, inferior and 
irrational. 
One of the most notable reversals of 
this pattern occurs in Doris Lessing's 
The Four-Gated City (1969) where Lynda, 
the Mad Wife, lives in the basement of 
the house inhabited by her husband, 
her children and Martha Quest, the 
central female character.(11) Since the 
idea of descent is both l i t e r a l and 
symbolic in Lessing's later f i c t i o n , 
i t i s significant that Lynda i s in the 
basement. The other members of the 
household have to descend to converse 
with her and eventually Martha descends 
in order to experience madness with 
her. In Lessing's terms, madness i s 
no longer avoided or projected onto the 
Other, i t i s actively sought out as a 
means to vision. She challenges the 
conventional definition of madness: 
The c i v i l i z e d human race knew that 
i t s primitive members (for instance, 
Bushmen) used a l l kinds of senses 
not used by i t s e l f , or not admitted: 
hunches, telepathy, 'visions', etc. 
It knew that past ci v i l i z a t i o n s , 
some of them very highly developed, 
used these senses and capacities. 
It knew that members of i t s own 
kind claimed at certain times to 
experience these capacities. But 
i t was apparently incapable of put-
ting these facts together to suggest 
the possibility that they were 
calling people mad who merely pos-
sessed certain faculties in embryo. 
(pp. 538-539) 
This challenge to rational definition 
also extends to condemnation of treat-
ment: 
And just as we now say 'they 
burned and drowned witches for a 
couple of centuries out of a 
primitive and ignorant terror', 
soon we w i l l be saying: 'When they 
stopped torturing and k i l l i n g 
witches, they locked people with 
certain capacities into lunatic 
asylums and told them they were 
freaks, and forced them into con-
formity by varieties of torture 
which included electric shocks, 
solitary confinement, ice baths, 
and forcible feeding. They used 
every kind of degradation, moral 
and physical. As the methods of 
society for control and manipula-
tion became more refined, i t was 
discovered that the extremities of 
physical violence were less effec-
tive than drugs which deprived the 
victims of their moral stamina and 
abili t y to fight back: and more 
effective than the drugs, were 
techniques of persuasion and brain-
washing. By these means these mem-
bers of the population with capaci-
ties above normal. . . were 
systematically destroyed. . . . 
(pp. 539-540) 
Lessing thus locates herself within 
two traditions, one very old, the other 
relatively recent. The association of 
madness with vision, some kind of 
divine revelation, is ancient. Cas-
sandra or the prophets of the Old 
Testament belong to this tradition. A 
more recent tradition has developed 
from critiques of the psychiatric pro-
fession by psychiatrists such as R.D. 
Laing and Thomas Szasz. Szasz 1 work 
on the myth of mental illness and the 
manufacture of madness closely paral-
le l s the cultural shift portrayed in 
Lessing's novel. Szasz claims that 
there i s an analogy between the social 
phenomena and treatment of witchcraft 
in the Middle Ages and the social 
phenomena and treatment of madness in 
modern times: " . . . the concept of 
mental illness has the same logical 
and empirical status as the concept of 
witchcraft; in short, . . . witchcraft 
and mental illness are imprecise and" 
all-embracing concepts, freely adaptable 
to whatever uses the priest or physician 
. . . wishes to put them."(12) He fur-
ther alleges that " . . . Institutional 
Psychiatry f u l f i l l s a basic human need— 
to validate the Self as good (normal) 
by invalidating the Other as e v i l (men-
ta l l y i l l ) . " (p. xxvii) 
Of particular interest are Szasz' com-
ments on language and i t s place in con-
structing a mythos. His comment on 
Freud i s i l l u s t r a t i v e : "Although 
Freud's 'therapeutic' methods differed 
from those of his colleagues, his 
enthusiastic endorsement and use of a 
psychiatric vocabulary for denigrating 
people place him in the mainstream of 
psychiatric thought: by reclassifying 
witches as neurotics, he helped to 
replace theological by psychiatric 
methods of invalidating human beings. 
The result—which is contemporary his-
t o r y — i s a justificatory rhetoric 
legitimizing man's inhumanity to man 
not by Appeals to God but by appeals 
to Health."(p. 69) This kind of 
rhetoric contributes to the mythos of 
madness and Szasz warns us: "Myths are 
not a r t i s t i c embellishments, fairy 
stories men make up to amuse them-
selves and their fellows; they are the 
very heart and brain, as i t were, of 
the social organism, necessary for i t s 
survival—as that particular society." 
(p. 121) Mythos and Logos become in-
separable and condition our perceptions 
because we li v e within them. 
Much of the linguistic work of the re-
cent past has been concerned with this 
very problem. Edward Sapir, a pioneer 
in this f i e l d , describes the relation-
ship between language and thought: 
Language is a guide to "social 
r e a l i t y " . . . . Human beings do not 
live in the objective world alone, 
nor alone in the world of social 
activity as ordinarily understood, 
but are very much at the mercy of 
expression for their society. . . . 
The fact of the matter is that the 
"real world" is to a large extent 
unconsciously built up on the 
language habits of the group. . . . 
We see and hear and otherwise ex-
perience very largely as we do 
because the language habits of our 
community predispose certain 
choices of interpretation.(13) 
Now as language conditions our percep-
tion of reality, so particular uses of 
language, such as psychiatric jargon, 
define a particular reality instead of 
describing i t . Rosenhan's famous ex-
periment with pseudopatients, eight of 
whom were admitted to twelve different 
mental hospitals, diagnosed as mentally 
i l l and discharged as "in remission," 
caused him to comment: 
Once a person is designated ab-
normal, a l l of his other behaviors 
and characteristics are coloured 
by that label. Indeed, that label 
is so powerful that many of the 
pseudopatients' normal behaviors 
were overlooked entirely or pro-
foundly misinterpreted.(14) 
He concludes that "a psychiatric label 
has a l i f e and an influence of i t s 
own."(p. 50) In the same vein, Szasz 
claims that Freud's "psychoanalytic 
description of hysteria i s but a 
semantic revision of the demonological 
one."(p. 73) 
Such semantic revision i s charged with 
cultural assumptions. Rosenhan points 
to the need to understand the pervasive 
and corrosive influence of language 
when dealing with the irrational as 
manifested in so-called madness. On a 
larger and theoretical scale, Szasz 
points to the popular and medical re-
vision of witchcraft as the aberrant 
behaviour of disturbed personalities 
who, in our enlightened twentieth cen-
tury, would be cared for in mental 
hospitals; that i s , the psychiatric 
shift focusses on witch as potential 
patient and therefore avoids having to 
deal with the witch persecutor. The 
moral issue is c l a r i f i e d when Szasz 
quotes Henry Sigerist, an eminent 
medical historian: "No doubt many women 
who ended their lives at the stake were 
psychopathic personalities, not so the 
men who persecuted them."(p. 81Y 
The association of women with the type 
of behaviour defined as witchcraft i s 
yet another example of cultural pat-
terning whereby women bear the burden 
of the irrational when i t is seen as 
sexual, chaotic and e v i l . In reality 
these women were frequently local 
healers for the common people, many of 
them midwives with a certain herbal 
knowledge and a store of folk medicine 
passed on orally from generation to 
generation.(15) These "wise women" or 
"good" witches were especially re-
sented by the Church as "an affront 
to the supremacy of the Cleric." 
(Szasz, p. 86) 
What we have then i s a patriarchal 
Church jealously guarding i t s authority 
over the irrational dimensions of l i f e . 
Faith in the dogma and teachings of 
the Church i s the irrational Good; 
lack of faith or faith projected 
through other channels i s the i r r a -
tional E v i l . Thus a dualistic morality 
is transposed upon ent:re categories of 
experience. 
If we accept Szasz' hypothesis, then we 
have a continuation of this pattern i n -
to the twentieth century with the 
psychiatrist replacing the priest and 
the irrational E v i l being replaced by 
Mental Illness. One point i s demons-
trable: the authority to define the 
irrational i s s t i l l largely in the 
hands of a patriarchal institution. 
Therefore, while men as well as women 
are subject to certain abuses in the 
name of therapy, we can expect that 
women, as a class i f not a caste, w i l l 
suffer more, precisely because they 
are women. 
Feminist analysis of the psychiatric 
profession sustains such a conclusion. 
Phyllis Chesler's Women and Madness 
(1972) was a breakthrough in this f i e l d . 
Her inclusion of interviews and state-
ments by patients was significant in 
that i t interjected the personal and 
subjective experience back into the 
abstract and so-called objective frame-
work of much psychiatric theory and 
practice. In this way the patient's 
experience of reality i s not automatic-
ally invalidated by being confined to 
a definitive category such as manic 
depressive. Instead, Chesler ques-
tions the validity of those categories. 
Dorothy E. Smith and Sara David's 
Women Look At Psychiatry i s a more 
balanced attempt at the same end. 
Smith bluntly states: "Psychiatry be-
comes for women a mechanism of control 
which deals with problems of f i t be-
tween the terms they are given to think 
and become conscious of their world, 
and the actualities of their experi-
ence ."(16) Smith and David attempt to 
view psychiatry within a p o l i t i c a l and 
cultural context. If we are in a so-
ciety where the norm is patriarchal 
and middle class, then the behaviour of 
females and lower class males is most 
likely to deviate from that norm. If 
psychiatry does function as a mechanism 
of control for that society, then i t s 
categories of rational/irrational are 
relative and directed towards certain 
cultural ends. Such ends may be im-
p l i c i t or explicit. For example, 
Broverman and Broverman's experiments 
with clinicians confirm that "a double, 
standard of health exists for men and 
women. . . ."(17) They explain this 
double standard as stemming from: 
. . . the clinician's acceptance 
of an "adjustment" notion of 
health, for example, health con-
sists of a good adjustment to one's 
environment. . . . Thus, for a 
woman to be healthy, from an ad-
justment viewpoint, she must ad-
just to and accept the behavioral 
norms for her sex, even though 
these behaviors are less socially 
desirable and considered to be 
less healthy for the generalized 
competent, mature adult.(p. 324) 
If women try to step outside their 
cultural conditioning, they are liable 
to be labelled insane and locked up, 
not in the attic, but an asylum. Or, 
i f they can afford i t , they are liable 
to be treated by psychiatrists who at-
tempt to "adjust" them back to a sex-
role stereotype. The assumption is 
that the woman is personally respon-
sible for her problems and that i t is 
irrational not to want to function 
within the stereotype. 
Again we are confronted with li n g u i s t i c / 
psychiatric categories which mask the 
irrational with the pseudo-rational and 
so confuse genuine madness and suffer-
ing with a l l forms of eccentric and 
deviant behaviour. It becomes neces-
sary to find a method of describing the 
irrational which w i l l not invalidate i t 
by defining i t as outside the cultural 
norm. Faced with a similar dilemma in 
regard to traditional philosophy, the 
Existentialists turned to Art in order 
to more closely approach Being, the 
flux and flow of l i f e i t s e l f . So Art, 
like myth, becomes neither embellish-
ment nor luxury but at the heart's 
core of a society. Metaphor and image 
give us the possibility of shaping a 
new language which w i l l allow our ex-
perience and our communication of i t a 
possibility of closer f i t . 
In Lessing's novel, for example, 
Martha and Lynda are imaged as "working" 
together towards another kind of 
knowledge: 
Sometimes they talked, trying not 
to talk too rationally or logically, 
merely letting talk flow, since i n 
the spaces between words, sentences, 
something else might come in . They 
did not really know what they were 
doing, or how, really, they did i t . 
Yet out of a l l this material 
gathered, they began to get glimp-
ses of a new sort of understanding. 
They had no word for that 
either. Talking about i t , or around 
i t , they tended to s l i p back into 
talking about Lynda's being mad. 
(p. 388) 
."hey are caught in the cultural-
Linguistic net but nevertheless they 
show how a new exploration of an old 
territory i s possible. Significantly, 
the husband, Mark, never joins them 
in this work. He i s not a dominant, 
authoritarian figure but he holds on-
to the rational and does not belong in 
the basement. 
Yet another new direction is indicated 
by Marge Piercy's novel, Woman on the 
Edge of Time.(18) Borrowing from 
science fiction, Piercy creates a 
major character, Connie Ramos, who i s 
not only female but a chicana, poor 
and suffering. At the heart of her 
suffering her breakdown becomes a 
l i t e r a l breakthrough into another 
world existing in a fourth dimension 
of reality. In fact Piercy offers us 
a range of worlds to demonstrate the 
consequences of certain choices about 
how to run this planet Earth. She 
also tries out a new vocabulary, i n -
cluding words such as Perself for her/ 
him self. As a writer Piercy i s in 
struggle with what Adrienne Rich has 
defined as "the oppressor's language." 
Piercy also elaborates upon Lessing's 
suggestion that our society has so 
l i t t l e tolerance for experiences of 
the irrational that certain people are 
forced into madness as the only accep-
table way of coping. After living 
through Connie's experiences with her, 
i t is a shock for the reader to come 
to the last chapter which is written 
in the jargon of a medical report and 
which refers to her as "this socially 
disorganized individual" (p. 377), 
"this 35 year-old Mexican-American 
woman" (p. 379), and this "socially 
maladjusted individual." (.p. 380) 
Such language projects Connie as the 
Other and c l i n i c a l detachment becomes 
moral judgment. We then come f u l l 
c ircle back to Bertha Mason with Dr. 
Rochester in a white coat. 
Yet there are indications of a new 
type of woman. Connie Ramos learns not 
to be a victim either of her own mind 
or the culture which gives her a pass-
port of alleged identity. She re-
sembles the narrator of Margaret At-
wood's Surfacing who returns to sanity 
with the resolve, "This above a l l , not 
to be a victim."(19) In this novel 
Atwood also demonstrates the connection 
between language and rational cate-
gories. Her narrator has to "lose" 
language during her descent into mad-
ness and re-surface to claim i t as a 
bridge between herself and others 
rather than as the linguistic expres-
sion of a dualistic perception. The 
urge towards synthesis of rational/ 
irrational categories is the v i t a l 
thrust of this book. 
In the work of contemporary women 
writers a new map of our mental land-
scape is being charted. The Mad Wife/ 
Woman is no longer the Other but our-
selves and the subjective experience of 
that madness i s declared as valid as 
any area of our experience of being 
female. The articulation of that ex-
perience in our own language is impor-
tant. 
It i s also necessary to be aware of 
our culture's deep distrust of the 
Irrational. Recent c l i n i c a l work on 
the development of brain hemispheres 
is being hailed by some as a scientific 
breakthrough which has direct bearing 
on our knowledge of female/maleness. 
It i s our impulse, especially when we 
feel ourselves pressed by economic and 
p o l i t i c a l conditions, to define our-
selves biologically and have done with 
i t . Right hemisphere, l e f t hemisphere. 
Male, female. The idea has a powerful 
but familiar simplicity. Is i t reality 
we are describing or our perception of 
it? We should not reject new research 
out of hand but history should teach 
us caution i n our embracing of new 
categories which f i t so neatly into 
the dualistic mythos of our culture. 
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